



John P.. Judd and John L. Scadding*
On October 6, 1979, the Federal Reserve
announced that it would place "a greater em-
phasis in day-to-day operations on the supply
of bank reserves and less emphasis on confin-
ing short-term fluctuations in the Federal-funds
rate." This announcement signaled a funda-
mental change in the way the Federal Reserve
attempts to achieve its publicly announced tar-
get ranges for the monetary aggregates.! Spe-
cifically, the current monetary-control method
rests on targeting the quantity ofbank reserves
directly, whereas the previous method in-
volved targeting the cost faced by banks to
obtain those reserves, the Federal-funds rate.
The new emphasis on the quantity of bank
reserves has made the choice of reserve ac-
counting rules-i.e., the rules which define the
quantity of reserves the Federal Reserve re-
quires banks to hold-an important monetary-
control issue.
This paper is designed to analyze the short-
run monetary-control properties of several al-
ternative reserve-requirement rules under the
new reserves-control procedures. The analysis
is conducted in terms of a short-run money-
supply model recently developed at the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
2 The
model emphasizes the role of the Federal-
funds market-the market in which banks bor-
row reserves from other banks and nonbank
lenders-in determining the supply of money.
Commercial banks presently operate under
so-called lagged-reserve accounting.
3 Under
this rule, the Federal Reserve requires that, in
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any given week, banks hold reserves equal to
certain fixed proportions oftheir liabilities out-
standing two weeks ago. Thus required re-
serves are predetermined in any given week,
and as a consequence, banks have no way to
avoid deficiencies if the Federal Reserve does
not supply at least enough total reserves to
meet the requirements. Some analysts have
criticized this feature of lagged accounting as
weakening monetary control, because it means
that the supply of reserves must adjust to meet
banks' reserve needs. Instead, they argue, this
process should be reversed if monetary control
is to be effective: i.e., the Federal Reserve
should supply a fixed quantity of reserves, to
which the banking system would have to adjust
its required reserves through deposit changes.
Three alternative rules are claimed to have
superior monetary-control properties to lagged
reserve accounting. The most prominent of
these is contemporaneous reserve accounting,
the rule used prior to September 1968.
4 Under
this rule, bank reserve requirements are cal-
culated as fixed proportions of deposits in the
current week. As a consequence, this rule al-
lows banks to adjust their required reserves to
a fixed supply by the Federal Reserve. For
example, if the Federal Reserve wanted to re-
duce the money supply, it could supply fewer
reserves than banks are required to hold at
current deposit levels. Banks, with potential
reserve deficiencies, would then act to reduce
their deposit levels (and thus their required
reserves) to the fixed supply.
While contemporaneous accounting is ad-
vantageous for monetary control, it imposes
certain reserve-adjustment costs on banks.Specifically, banks find it costly to acquire the
contemporaneous deposit information on a
timely enough basis to calculate reserve re-
quirements accurately in any given week. This
problem has led to the development of two
alternative proposals, which attempt to avoid
the monetary-control difficulties of lagged ac-
counting without imposing the reserve-adjust-
ment costs of contemporaneous accounting.
First, William Poole of Brown University has
proposed that lagged reserve accounting be
amended to include a lOa-percent reserve re-
quirement on the change in deposits between
the current week and two weeks previously
(hereafter referred to as marginal reserve ac-
counting).5 Second, Robert Laurent of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago has pro-
posed a rule which essentially reverses the
lagged accounting rule by basing requirements
on contemporaneous deposits but allowing
banks to use only last week's reserves to satisfy
these requirements (hereafter referred to as
reverse lag accounting). 6 Both rules allow
banks to adjust required reserves (through cur-
rent deposit changes) to a fixed supply of re-
serves, since both include current deposits as
at least part of the reserve-requirement cal-
culation. Both rules also ease reserve-adjust-
ment costs for technical reasons discussed be-
low (Section II).
This paper examines, for each of these four
reserve-accounting rules, deposit-control er-
rors resulting from two types of "shocks" to
the reserves market: (1) an unexpected shift in
the public's demand for money or bank credit,
and (2) an unexpected shift in banks' demand
for borrowed reserves from the Federal Re-
serve. These "shocks" represent two impor-
tant sources of money-control errors-those
which affect banks' demand for reserves and
those which affect the supply of reserves. It is
thus useful to choose a reserve accounting rule
which insulates the reserve market from these
"shocks."
However, tighter monetary control often
causes larger fluctuations in the Federal-funds
rate. Economists disagree over how large such
fluctuations can becomebeforethey impose sig-
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nificant economic costs (e.g., disruptions of
credit flows), but the Federal Reserve in effect
must make that decision each month when it
sets its short-run monetary-control policy. As
noted earlier, the primary emphasis of current
policy is on bank reserves. The Fed, however,
has a secondary concern with the Federal-
funds rate, as reflected in the tolerance band set
for this rate each month. (But the band is
rather wide-6 percentage points wide in Au-
gust 1980, for example.) Thus an evaluation of
alternative reserve-requirement rules within
the context of current monetary-control pro-
cedures requires some attention to interest-
rate variability. Our approach in this article
will mirror the Federal Reserve's current ap-
proach-with primary emphasis on monetary
control and secondary emphasis on interest-
rate variability.
Our overall conclusion is that short-run
monetary control would be improved by re-
placing the lagged accounting rule presently
used with either marginal or contemporaneous
accounting. On purely monetary-control
grounds, marginal accounting makes deposits
more resistant to unexpected "shocks" than
contemporaneous accounting. However, mar-
ginal accounting can entail significant interest-
rate variability. It also reduces the Federal Re-
serve's ability to prevent unwanted funds-rate
changes, such as when the tolerance range for
that rate is violated.
Thus when considering both interest-rate
variability and monetary control, the contem-
poraneous rule may be an effective compro-
mise choice. A possible alternative would be
marginal accounting but with the marginal re-
serve-requirement ratio reduced to, say, 75 or
50 percent. This change would retain part of
the rule's monetary-control advantage, and
give the Federal Reserve greater control over
the funds rate.
Lagged accounting and reverse lag account-
ing have the disadvantage that their short-run
control properties depend heavily on the Dis-
count Window. If such borrowings were near
zero, lagged accounting would make for poor
monetary control with reserves, while reverselag accounting would provide excellent con-
trol-but no better control than would be pro-
vided by contemporaneous and marginal ac-
counting. Ifborrowed reserves were significantly
positive, reverse lag accounting could lead to
very large swings in borrowed reserves, de-
posits and the funds rate, depending on how
accurately banks were able to forecast the fol-
lowing week's funds rate.
The next section of the paper describes the
money-supply model. Section II then uses this
model to analyze the monetary-control prop-
erties of the four reserve-accounting rules:
first, with shifts in the demand for bank credit
or deposits, and second, with shifts in the de-
mand for borrowed reserves. Section III con-
tains a summary and conclusions.
I. Short-Run Deposit Supply Model
The deposit supply model emphasizes the
role of banks' management of non-deposit
sources of funds in determining the supply of
deposits.
7 (A formal derivation of the model
is given in the Appendix.) By deposits we
mean the traditional deposit components of
the monetary aggregates-demand and other
checkable deposits and small time and savings
deposits. Non-deposit funds on the other hand
represent alternatives to these traditional de-
posits as a way of banks raising funds (even
though technically they may be deposits, like
large CDs, for example.) Non-deposit sources
can be divided into three broad categories:
managed liabilities (such as large CDs and
Eurodollar borrowings), Federal-funds trans-
actions and repurchase agreements, and dis-
count-window borrowings. In the past decade,
such funds have become an important alter-
native to deposits as a source of bank financ-
ing~ In our model, the stock of deposits de-
pends critically on bank and public decisions
about the amount outstanding of such non-de-
posit funds.
Demand For and Supply of Reserves
The short-run problem for a representative
bank is financing a given (exogenous) stock of
loans. Loans are exogenous in the short run
because they are determined primarily by the
public's demand for them. Banks set the loan
rate on the basis of the marginal cost of funds,
and then lend whatever is demanded by the
public. They adjust the rate slowly, however,
so that in the short run it is essentially fixed.
The quantity of loans therefore is determined
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primarily by the public's demand, and thus is
outside banks' immediate control.
Part of the bank's portfolio of loans is fi-
nanced by its deposits. These too the individ-
ual bank views as exogenous. Deposit rates
(like loan rates) are adjusted sluggishly by
banks, so that each views the quantity of de-
posits in the short run as essentially outside its
control, being determined instead by the pub-
lic's demand.
Banks must finance the excess of loans over
deposits by borrowing non-deposit funds from
the public. Banks choose among the different
types of non-deposit funds on the basis (among
other things) of their relative costs, which
largely reflect the rates of interest that must be
paid to induce the public to supply funds.
Central to the analysis is the role of the
Federal-funds rate. Since Federal funds are
substitutes from the banks' viewpoint for other
non-deposit funds ,9 a higher funds rate is trans-
mitted to other non-deposit rates as banks seek
cheaper sources of financing. Higher rates of
interest paid on non-deposit funds in turn
cause the public to supply more of them. This
they do by drawing on their deposit accounts,
which causes the aggregate stock of deposits
to fall. Thus, for a given stock of loans, the
supply of deposits is effectively determined as
a residual item on banks' balance sheets, with
a higher funds rate being associated with a
lower stock of deposits.
The division of the financing of the banking
system's portfolio of loans between deposits
and non-deposit funds in turn determines the
banking system's need for reserves. A rise inFederal-funds and other non-deposit rates is
associated with a fall in deposits. The latter in
turn means a reduction in banks' need for re-
quired reserves. Thus ultimately a higher funds
rate is reflected in a smaller need for required
reserves. This need can be thought of as the
banking system's "demand" for reserves, so
that equivalently one can say that a higher
funds rate lowers the aggregate demand for
reserves.
The supply of reserves to the banking system
is also a function of the funds rate-in this
case, an upward-sloping function. To the in-
dividual bank, borrowing from the Discount
Window is a substitute for borrowing in the
Federal-funds market. A higher funds rate
therefore leads banks to begin borrowing from
the Window, which means an addition to the
total supply of reserves in the system.
Equilibrium in Reserves Market
In general there will be only one funds rate
and associated level of deposits at which the
demand for and supply of reserves are equal.
This condition defines the short-run equilib-
rium for the money-supply model, as illus-
trated in Figure 1. The R d curve in the north-
east quadrant traces out the demand for
reserves as a function of the funds rate, in the
following manner. The 45-degree line in the
southwest quadrant defines the balance-sheet
constraint for the banking system, with its po-
sition determined by the exogenous quantities
of loans (L) and nonborrowed reserves (Ru)
held by the system. Its negative slope embod-
ies the accounting tradeoff between deposits
(D) and non-deposit funds (managed liabili-
ties, 1MB, and Fed funds, FF) as ways of fi-
nancing this portfolio.
Each point on the balance-sheet constraint
defines a different split of banks' liabilities be-
tween deposits and nondeposit funds. The
curve OF in the northwest quadrant in turn
associates a unique level of the funds rate with
each such split. The curve is derived from the
market-equilibrium condition equating the
amount of non-deposit funds (1MB +FF)









willing to supply. It is upward sloping with
respect to the funds rate, because interest rates
on non-deposit funds must rise in order to per-
suade the public to supply larger amounts of
such funds.
The split of banks' liabilities between de-
posits and non-deposits can also be associated
with a unique level of required reserves by
using the required-reserves ray, roD, in the
southeast quadrant of Figure 1. Here, for sim-
plicity, we assume that only deposits are re-
servable, with ro being the required-reserve
ratio. Each point on the budget line has a
corresponding unique level of deposits, which
in turn, with roD, defines a unique level of
required reserves, Rd.
Finally, the curve R d plots the combination
offunds rate and required reserves that is con-
sistent with each level of deposits in the bank-
ing system. It can be interpreted, as we men-
tioned earlier, as the banking system's demand
for reserves. The quantity demanded is the
amount of required reserves the system must
hold given the level of deposits. The "price"
of such reserves is the cost of acquiring themin the non-deposit funds markets. Since Fed-
eral funds and managed liabilities (like large
CDs) are substitutes, their rates move to-
gether, so that we can use the funds rate as the
cost of acquiring reserves.
The supply of reserves, both borrowed and
nonborrowed, is also depicted in Figure 1. The
supply of nonborrowed reserves is determined
almost entirely by Federal Reserve open-mar-
ket operations. Nonborrowed reserves are
shown graphically by the vertical curve RU in
the northeast quadrant of Figure 1.
The amount of borrowed reserves is deter-
mined by banks' decisions about borrowing
from the Federal Reserve versus borrowing in
the nearest substitute market, the Fed-funds
market. A higher funds rate causes banks to
switch out of the funds market and borrow
more from the Discount Window instead.
Banks' aggregate demand for borrowing from
the Window therefore is shown by the upward
sloping curve BR* in the northeast quadrant
of Figure 1. Adding BR* to the exogenous
stock of nonborrowed reserves, RU, defines
the supply curve of total reserves, Rs. Note
that Rs is vertical over part of its range, re-
flecting the point that once the funds rate falls
below the discount rate, member-bank bor-
rowing becomes zero.
Short-run equilibrium is defined by the in-
Figure 2a
Reserves Targeting
tersection of Rd and Rs. The equilibrium funds
rate is i? and the corresponding level of de-
posits is D°. There are two dimensions to this
equilibrium. First, the amount of nondeposit
funds the public is willing to supply at i? is
equal to the amount banks need, given that
deposits are D°. Second, the amount of re-
serves that banks must hold when deposits are
D° equals the sum of what banks borrow when
the funds rate is i? plus the amount of nonbor-
rowed reserves the Federal Reserve supplies.
Reserves Operating Procedures
The two curves, Rs and Rd , can be used to
illustrate the nature of a reserves operating
procedure (Figures 2a and 2b). In Figure 2a,
0* is the target for deposits. For the banking
system to produce deposits of 0* means that
required reserves must be rDD* = R* (We
assume a contemporaneous accounting rule for
illustrative purposes). Conversely, if total re-
serves are R*, banks will be in equilibrium
only when deposits are 0*. Hence R* is the
amount of reserves that must be supplied in
order to produce the target level of deposits,
and therefore represents the Federal Reserve's
target for total reserves.
Part of R* will be supplied by banks borrow-







Rserve therefore must make an estimate of the
amount of borrowing that is consistent with its
total-reserves target. This will depend, among
other things, on the level of the funds rate that
corresponds to the total-reserves target, and
on the discount rate. In Figure 2a, total re-
serves of R* are consistent with a funds rate
of i;, which in turn implies borrowing of BR*.
The difference between R* and BR* measures
the amount ofnonborrowed reserves that must
be supplied by the Federal Reserve, primarily
through open-market operations. In Figure 2a,
RU* is that amount; it therefore represents
the Federal Reserve's nonborrowed-reserves
target.
Changes in either the Rdor Rs schedules in
general will necessitate changing at least one
of the targets. A change in Rd can occur, for
example, because the public's demand for de-
posits has changed. In Figure 2b, a rise in the
demand for deposits is illustrated by a right-
ward shift in Rd, reflecting the fact that a given
funds rate is now consistent with higher de-
posits and therefore with higher required re-
serves. Deposits will not actually rise, how-
ever, unless total reserves are allowed to
expand. Hence if the Federal Reserve wants
to stick to its original deposit target, it must
prevent total reserves from expanding.
The rise in the demand for reserves by itself
can be expected to increase total reserves. A
higher demand for reserves forces up the Fed-
eral-funds rate, which in turn drives banks out
of the funds market and into the Window,
causing borrowed reserves to rise. To counter-
act this, the Federal Reserve must drain off an
equal amount of nonborrowed reserves. In
other words, the Federal Reserve must revise
upwards its estimate of borrowing and reduce
its nonborrowed-reserves target by an equal
amount. In Figure 2b, this is illustrated by a
reduction in nonborrowed reserves to RU**,
which leaves total reserves at R*. In this way,
the Federal Reserve effectively converts an
upward-sloping supply curve of total reserves,
R" into a completely inelastic quantity of total
reserves fixed at R*-which is necessary, in
this simple example, if the target for deposits
is to be achieved. (This effective supply curve
is shown by the vertical curve through R* in
Figure 2b.) However, in order to do so the
Federal Reserve must predict the positions of
RSand Rd. Unpredictable shifts in either curve
cause actual deposits to deviate from targeted
deposits, D*. These deviations represent mon-
etary control errors, and their size depends on
the reserve accounting scheme in effect. The
remainder of this paper is taken up primarily
with evaluating different accounting schemes
on the basis of the amount of monetary control
they provide-i.e., according to the size of the
deviations from target they allow when shocks
occur either to the demand for or supply of
reserves.
II. Alternative Reserve Requirement Rules
The four reserve-accounting rules consid-
ered are:
1. Contemporaneous Reserve Accounting
(eRA): Rt = rDD t
2. Lagged Reserve Accounting (LRA):
Rt =rDD'_2
3. Marginal Reserve Accounting (MRA):
R t = rD D'_2+(D,- D,_2)
4. Reverse Lag Accounting (RLA):
Rt _ 1=rDDt
In the long-run, a given change in reserves
and other variables (e.g., shifts in the demand
for deposits or bank credit) have an equal ef-
fect on deposits under all four of these rules.
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This is true because in long-run equilibrium,
D, = D'_l = D'_2 and R, = Rt_ l . As a conse-
quence, all four rules set reserve requirements
equal to rDD" the CRA rule. In the short-run,
however, the choice of a rule has a potentially
strong influence on the responsiveness of de-
posits to reserve and other changes. Thus the
following analysis will focus on deposit control
within a weekly context.
We examine in detail the responses of de-
posits and the funds rate to an unexpected shift
in bank credit or deposit demand, under all
four reserve-requirement rules. Following that
analysis, we examine the responses to an un-expected shift in bank demand for reserves
from the Federal Reserve's Discount Window.
Such unexpected shocks represent important
sources of short-run money-control errors, so
that it is desirable (ceteris paribus) to choose
a reserve-requirement rule which minimizes
these errors. However, rules which satisfy this
criteria also tend to reduce the responsiveness
of deposits to open-market operations, i.e., by
requiring larger operations. But since a large
open-market operation apparently costs little
more than a small open-market operation, this
feature of the rules deserves little weight.
Furthermore, rules which imply smaller de-
posit changes in response to shocks often imply
larger funds-rate changes. Funds-rate variabil-
ity has both positive and negative side effects.
Unexpected changes in the funds rate can sig-
nal the Fed's Open Market Desk that money
is deviating from its target, and can thus con-
tribute to tighter monetary control. On the
other hand, interest-rate variability at some
point significantly disrupts the flow of funds
through financial markets. III In recognition of
this fact, the Fed sets ranges-albeit rather
wide ranges-for the funds rate. For example,
at the August 12, 1980 meeting of the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMe), the group
set a range of 8 to 14 percent for the funds
rate. II A reserve-requirement rule resulting in
frequent violations of those bands would not
be desirable within current operating proce-
dures. Thus we should consider the effects of
the four rules on extreme funds-rate variability
and on the Desk's ability to prevent unaccept-
able variability.
Contemporaneous Reserve Accounting
First, consider what happens to deposits and
the funds rate when exogenously determined
bank loans rise under contemporaneous re-
serve accounting, or CRA (Figure 3). The re-
serve accounting rule is shown in the SE quad-
rant. We begin with the model in equilibrium
at point A, which is also taken to be the target
level of deposits. We next introduce a "shock"
in the form of an increase in loans, and see
how far from point A deposits move in the
short-run.
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An increase in loans shifts the banking sys-
tem's balance-sheet constraint equation down-
ward (from solid to dashed line in the SW
quadrant of Figure 3)-i.e., for any given level
of managed liabilities, deposits must increase
dollar for dollar with loans. Such a rise in
deposits would increase banks' demand for re-
serves by the fraction rD times the rise in de-
posits. This is reflected in the shift from the
solid to dashed Rd line in the NE quadrant.
Thus an increase in loans, together with the
associated increase in reserves demand, causes
deposits, the funds rate, managed liabilities,
and reserves to rise from point A to point Z.
The error in hitting the deposit target is mea-
sured as the distance from point A to Z on the
vertical deposit axis. (It should be recognized
that a bank-loan shift is illustrative of a num-
ber of other factors causing shifts in the Rd
curve, such as shifts in the public's demand for
demand deposits.)
Under CRA, the deposit-control error
shown in Figure 3 represents both a short- and
Figure 3
Loan Demand Shift










oa long-run error. The CRA rule does not itself
provide a distinction between short-run (or
dynamic) effects and long-run (or equilibrium)
effects, as the other reserves rules do. Thus,
under CRA, any differences between the
short- and long-run effects ofa change in loans
would depend on the banking system's partial
adjustment behavior. The other three reserve
rules, however, would produce dynamic de-
posit adjustments even with full adjustment by
banks within the accounting period. In the re-
mainder of the paper, we assume instanta-
neous adjustment, so that we can focus on the
influence of the reserve rules themselves on re-
serve-market dynamics.
Lagged Reserve Accounting
Next, consider the dynamic response of de-
posits to a loan "shock" under lagged reserve
accounting, or LRA (Figure 4). In the SE
quadrant, LRA is represented by a vertical
reserve-requirement line in the short-run, and
Figure 4
Loan Demand Shift




thus a vertical short-run reserves-demand
function (Rd SR in the NE quadrant). In any
given week, required reserves equal rD Dt_2 and
thus Rd does not respond to changes in current
deposits or in the funds rate. 12 The long-run
reserve-requirement line (rDD t in the SE quad-
rant), and thus the long-run reserves-demand
function (solid line marked RdLR in NE quad-
rant), are identical to their counterparts under
CRA.
We again begin in equilibrium at point A
(Figure 4), and assume that bank loans in-
crease exogenously-represented by the dot-
ted lines in the SW and NE quadrants. The
funds rate is determined by the intersection of
the short-run Rd function and the Rs function.
Since RdSR is predetermined in any given week,
the increase in loans has no effect on iF. As a
consequence, 1MB+FF remains unchanged,
and the entire increase in loans is financed with
deposits. Thus in the current week, deposits
increase beyond point Z-the same point Z as
in CRA's Figure 3-to point B, indicating a
larger money-control error than under CRA.
In subsequent weeks, deposits oscillate around
point Z, finally converging to it. Under this
standard result, short-run control errors are
larger with LRA than with CRA, but long-run
errors are the same under the two rules. 13
Also, under LRA, the funds rate does not
change in the current week when bank loans
rise, and thus provides no current-week signal
to the Desk that deposits will exceed target.
But this disadvantage for monetary control
carries with it an advantage for bank reserve
adjustment. The funds rate does not change in
the current week because required reserves are
not dependent on current deposits. This means
that banks need not acquire contemporaneous
deposit information to calculate their reserve
requirements. Instead they need information
on deposits two weeks previously, which is
often much less costly to acquire. Of course,
banks must still obtain contemporaneous in-
formation on their reserve holdings, but these
data are more easily available, being kept by
the Federal Reserve and supplied to banks
with only a short lag.The preceding analysis implicitly assumes
that the funds rate is above the discount rate,
and thus that Discount-Window borrowings
are above frictional levels: i.e., reserve-market
equilibrium occurs on the upward-sloping part
of Rs. Once this assumption is dropped, mon-
etary control under LRA is virtually impossi-
ble with a reserves instrument. Assume, for
example, that bank loans declined, shifting the
Rd curve so far to the left that the funds rate
dropped below the fixed discount rate. Bor-
rowed reserves will be at frictional levels, and
reserve-market equilibrium will occur on the
vertical portion of Rs. Thus in any given week,
both Rs and Rs~ are vertical, and there are no
market forces determining the funds rate. As
a consequence, the Fed in effect would have
to revert to its previous funds-rate operating
approach, and conduct open-market opera-
tions to fix the funds rate at some target level
(i.e., the Fed would have to make Rs horizon-
tal at the targeted funds rate). Thus the fea-
sibility of monetary control with reserves un-
der LRA depends heavily on the funds rate
being sufficiently above the discount rate so
that borrowed reserves exceed frictional lev-
els. 14
Marginal Reserve Accounting
Under marginal reserve accounting (MRA),
banks are required to hold reserves according
to LRA, plus 100 percent of the change in
deposits over the preceding two-week period
(Figure 5). The short-run 100-percent mar-
ginal requirement is plotted as the 45 degree
line Dt - (l-rD)Dt- 2 in the SE quadrant, while
in the long-run, reserve requirements are iden-
tical to CRA (denoted by the roD, line). Thus,
MRA has a short-run advantage of 100-
percent reserve requirements (i.e., a deposit
multiplier with respect to total reserves of
one), plus a long-run advantage of fractional
reserve requirements (i.e., a banking system
which can make loans).15 Furthermore, this
rule is designed to ease banks' reserve adjust-
ments. Deposit inflows (expected or unex-
pected) have no current-week impact on




Marginal Reserve Accounting: R,~D, -(1-ro)D"
i,
cause changes in reserves are met by equal
changes in required reserves. In addition, any
increase (decrease) in bank assets causes an
equal increase (decrease) in banks' reserve po-
sition, no matter what the loan redeposit rate
is.
As before, we begin (in Figure 5) at point
A, and assume an exogenous increase in bank
loans. In the current week, the funds rate in-
creases to the intersection of Rs and RdsR in
the NE quadrant (point B). This funds-rate
increase is larger than under CRA (or LRA).
The large rise in the funds rate, however, in-
duces a larger increase in managed liabilities
and thus a smaller increase in deposits than
under CRA and LRA. The relatively small
rise in current deposits reflects the dampening
effect of 100-percent marginal reserve require-
ments on the current week's deposit change.
The larger increase in the funds rate under
MRA also ensures that the Desk receives a
strong signal that the aggregates may not beon target. But the strong signal carries the risk
that the funds rate will exceed the FOMC's
tolerance band, especially in the short-run. An
open-market operation done with the nonbank
public (i.e., a nonbank government-securities
dealer) would create an equal quantity of de-
posits and thus required reserves.
16 Since the
higher supply of reserves would be met with
an equal increase in reserves demanded, the
funds rate would not change in the current
week. The Desk could partially circumvent
this problem by doing open-market operations
directly with banks (i.e., a bank government-
securities dealer) when it needed to control
the interest rate. In this way, reserves could be
supplied without immediately increasing de-
posits and thus required reserves.
17 Another
possible solution would be to reduce Poole's
proposed lOO-percent marginal reserve re-
quirement to, say, 75 or 50 percent. This
change would in effect sacrifice some precision
of short-run monetary control to gain some
short-run interest-rate control. 18
Reverse Lag Accounting
Under reverse lag accounting (RLA),
banks' required reserves are identical to CRA
(SE quadrant of Figure 6), but the reserves
which they can use to meet their requirements
are those held in the preceding week. Thus
reserves supplied in any given week are pre-
determined (see the vertical R sSR in the NE
quadrant), and current deposits must change
so that required reserves are brought into line
with the fixed reserves supplied. This situation
is just opposite to LRA. Under LRA, required
reserves are predetermined in any given week,
and the supply of reserves (either from open-
market operations or the Discount Window)
must accommodate the fixed demand. Another
potential advantage of this proposal is that it
includes three additional technical rules de-
signed to lower the cost to individual banks of
adjustment to reserve imbalances. 19
Under RLA, the shift in bank loans (and
thus in bank reserves demand) causes a large
increase in the funds rate (intersection of the




Reverse Lag Accounting: R,~,"'rDD,
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fixed reserves supply cannot accommodate
even part of the higher demand. This large
funds-rate increase is necessary if banks are to
accommodate the increase in loans, since none
of the new loans can be financed by increased
deposits. Thus banks must bid up rates on Fed-
eral funds and managed liabilities by just
enough to attract sufficient funds from the non-
bank public to finance the loans. (1MB +FF
increases from A to B in the SW quadrant.)
Such large funds-rate changes would present
a problem for the Open Market Desk when
that rate pierced the FOMC's tolerance band.
The Desk would not be able to bring the funds
rate back into the band in the current week,
because that week's reserve injections could
not be used by banks to satisfy reserve require-
ments until the following week. Thus the adop-
tion ofRLA would seem to require the FOMC
to define its funds-rate bands over at least two-
week and probably one-month periods.The dynamic properties of deposits and the
funds rate in the weeks following an increase
in bank loans under RLA appear to depend
importantly on whether borrowed reserves are
positive or at frictional levels. Laurent (1979)
suggests the desirability ofeliminating the Dis-
count Window under RLA, which presumably
would involve maintaining the discount rate at
a penalty above the funds rate. 20 Our analysis
supports that conclusion.
With borrowed reserves at frictional levels,
the vertical RSSR in Figure 6 would also be the
long-run reserves-supply function, and the
shift in bank loans would raise the new long-
run reserve-market equilibrium to point B.
Thus, the shift in bank loans would not affect
deposits even in the long-run.
With significantly positive borrowed re-
serves, the long-run reserve-supply schedule
would be positively sloped-shown by RSLR in
Figure 6. In this case, banks would have to
make two decisions whenever loans increase.
First, they would have to decide how to fund
those loans in the current week, resulting in a
movement from A to B, as discussed above.
In addition, banks would need to decide on
Discount-Window borrowing in the current
week. This borrowing would partially deter-
mine (along with the Desk's current-week
open-market operations) the pOSItion of the
fixed supply of reserves they face in thefollow-
ing week. The amount banks decide to borrow
in the current week will depend on the current
discount rate and the following week's ex-
pected funds rate and managed liability rate.
If, for example, banks on average expect the
funds rate to be at point Z in the following
week, banks in the aggregate would borrow
enough to put the Rs~ at point Z at that time.
With this accomplished, banks would be able
to adjust their balance sheets to long-run equi-
librium. As a result, deposits would move to
the long-run equilibrium point Z in the second
week and no further adjustments would be
necessary. Under these circumstances, RLA
would work like CRA with a one-week lag.
However, if banks on average were less suc-
cessful at forecasting the future funds rate, the
RLA rule would have uncertain effects on de-
posits, reserves and the funds rate. Assume
that banks expect the funds rate to remain at
the current week's level in the following week.
The very high funds rate in the current week
causes a high level of bank borrowing from the
window (Figure 6, point B').21 The high bor-
rowing means that the reserves supply in the
following week increases substantially-the
RSSR for week t+1 is a vertical line through
Table 1
Rankings of Reserve Requirement Rules:
Unexpected Shift in Deposit or Loan Demand
Positive Borrowed Reserves Frictional Borrowed Reserves
Smaller Smaller Smaller Smaller
Deposit Control Funds Rate Deposit Control Funds Rate
Error Change Error Change
Contemporaneous 2 2 I
Lagged 3 4 4
Marginal I 3 1
Reverse 4 4
13pointB'. Thus, the funds rate falls and de·
posits rise sharply to point C in that week.
22
We are not arguing that banks would in fact
forecast in this particular way. But we would
expect frequent errors in funds·rate forecasts
on a week·by·week basis, considering that they
are based on individual banks' forecasts of
such factors as changes in aggregate bank
credit, demand for deposits, and inflation ex·
pectations. Thus the shorHun control prop·
erties of RLA would be unpredictable, de·
pending on the week·by·week size and
directionoffunds·rate forecast errors.
Comparison of Rules
The four reserve·requirement rules may be
analyzed in terms of the sizes of short·run de·
posit·control errors and Federal·funds rate
changes. (In Table 1, a ranking of one indicates
the smallest control error and the smallest
funds·rate change.) With positive borrowed
reserves, MRA outperforms CRA, which in
turn outperforms LRA, in terms of short·run
Figure 7
Borrowed Reserves Demand Shift
Contemporaneous Reserve Accounting: R.;;<rDD.
iF
o
deposit control. RLA would rank last because
of its more unpredictable and potentially
larger control errors. While MRA is highly
successful at insulating deposits from reserves·
demand shocks, it results in larger funds·rate
changes than either contemporaneous or
lagged.reserve accounting (although smaller
changes than RLA). Moreover, both MRA
and RLA would make it difficult for the Trad·
ing Desk to offset unwanted funds·rate
changes.
The monetary·control advantages of MRA
relative.to CRA arid RLA would be la.rgely
neutralized if borrowed reserves were at fric·
tional levels. Under all three rules, a shift in
deposit or loan demand would result in no
deposit·control error (since Rs would be ver·
tical), and an equal (large) change in the funds
rate. Moreover, CRA would outperform RLA
and MRA because of the contemporaneous
impact of open·market operations on the de·
posit·supply curve. Thus in the face ofexternal
shocks, the Desk could keep the funds rate
Figure 8
Borrowed Reserves Demand Shift




14inside the FOMe's range under CRA, but
would have difficulty doing so in the current
week under the other two rules. Finally, under
LRA, the reserves operating approach would
be infeasible, and the Fed would most likely
revert to its former procedure of setting funds-
rate targets.
Shift in Demand for Borrowed Reserves
Up to this point, we have discussed in detail
the short-run monetary-control errors result-
ing from an unexpected shift in the R d func-
tion. Now we briefly present a similar analysis
of an unexpected shift in the Rs function,
caused by a change in banks' preferences for
borrowing reserves from the Discount Win-
dow-in other words, a change in what is tra-
ditionally called banks' "reluctance to borrow"
from the Discount Window. Figures 7-10 illus-
trate the issues involved with the example of
a decline in banks' preference for borrowing,
depicted by a leftward shift in the reserves
supply schedule, Rs. In this case, rankings by
Figure 9
Borrowed Reserves Demand Shift
Marginal Reserve Accounting: R,2'D, ~ (1 ~ rD)D'~2
control errors and funds-rate changes are the
same. A rule that produces a large fall in de-
posits when borrowed reserves decline means
banks must rely more heavily on managed
funds, which produces larger increases in the
funds rate.
Thus, for example, MRA restrains deposits
to fall by only the reduction in reserves in the
short run, and hence produces the smallest rise
in the funds rate (Figure 9). CRA comes next
because it causes deposits to fall by a multiple
of the decline in borrowed reserves, putting
more pressure on non-deposit funds including
Federal funds (Figure 7). LRA does worst of
the three because it requires a large fall in
deposits in order to put enough pressure on
the funds rate to force banks to borrow more
from the Window despite their increased re-
luctance to do so (Figure 8).
RLA appears to provide the weakest mon-
etary and funds-rate control of all if there is
positive borrowing. In the very short run,
there is no change in either deposits or the
Figure 10
Borrowed Reserves Demand Shift







Unexpected Shift in Demand for
Borrowed Reserves
funds rate (point B, Figure 10). As before,
subsequent behavior depends crucially on how
banks forecast future funds rates. Assuming
an unchanged funds rate, for example, would
cause banks to repay borrowing and put the
system at C, producing a sharp rise in the funds
rate in the next week and a large decline in
deposits. However, since RLA apparently en-
visages reducing borrowing to frictional levels,
it is not clear that it can be legitimately eval-
uated on the basis of its response to borrowing
shocks.
Table 2 lists the rankings of the various rules
for monetary control and funds-rate changes.
It is clear from these rankings that for unex-
pected shifts in the reserves supply curve,
Poole's MRA proposal is superior to CRA,
















Policymakers' decisions on reserve-require-
ment rules depend importantly on the relative
weights they give to controlling money and
controlling the funds rate. Ifcontrolling money
growth were the only objective, then marginal
reserve accOl,mting clearly would be the most
effective rule to adopt. However, the Federal
Reserve currently gives some weight to reduc-
ing the size of funds-rate fluctuations, despite
its primary emphasis on controlling money.
Under these circumstances, contemporaneous
accounting appears to be the most effective
rule. An alternative would be to modify mar-
ginal accounting by reducing the marginal re-
serve requirement from 100 percent to, say, 50
or 75 percent. Such a rule would provide some-
what greater emphasis on monetary control
than is implicit in contemporaneous account-
ing.
The effectiveness of reverse lag accounting
and lagged accounting depends critically on
levels of borrowed reserves. If reserves are at
significantly positive levels, the reverse lag
could make monetary control highly unpre-
16
dictable. When borrowed reserves are at fric-
tional levels, the reverse lag provides for ex-
cellent monetary control, but no more so than
under the marginal and contemporaneous
rules. Moreover, the reverse lag would prevent
the Fed from reducing current-week variability
of interest rates.
Lagged reserve accounting, the rule pres-
ently used, can provide for adequate monetary
control when borrowed reserves are signifi-
cantly positive, though such control would be
inferior to contemporaneous and marginal ac-
counting. When borrowing is at frictional lev-
els, lagged accounting makes a reserves oper-
ating approach inoperable, and thus requires
the Fed to revert to direct funds-rate control.
However, the lagged rule has one major
advantage-a reduction in the costs of bank
data-gathering activities. Thus the issue of
abandoning lagged accounting, in favor of a
contemporaneous or modified marginal rule,
turns on the relative importance policymakers
attach to increased bank costs versus increased
accuracy of short-run monetary control.APPENDIX
Formal Derivation of the Model
Table Al
Representative Bank Balance Sheet
Profit Maximization
We view bank portfolio choices as the out-
comes of maximizing expected profit subject
to the balance-sheet constraint. In the very
Bank Balance Sheet
The balance sheet for a representative bank
is laid out in Table AI. A minimum of six
categories of bank assets or liabilities appears
to be necessary to preserve the usefulness of
the model, both as a policy tool and as a foun-
dation for an empirical model. These cate-
gories are reserves, R; bank loans, L; deposits,
0; managed liabilities, 1MB; member-bank
borrowing, BR; and net Federal-funds pur-





maxH = peL, R, D, 1MB, BR,FF)
l(R+L-D-IMB-BR-FF) (Al)
*Ernest Baltensperger, "Alternative Approaches to the
Theory of the Banking Firm," Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, January 1980, pp. 1-38, distinguishes two types of
non-interest costs. For liabilities, these include associated
costs of liquidity management, e.g., differences in with-
drawal risk, and costs of producing and maintaining de-
posit contracts. On the asset side, these include risks of
default, and information and transaction costs associated
with extending different types ofcredit. Baltensperger also
includes differences in the cost of acquiring or disposing
of an asset or liability.
short run, only 1MB, FF and BR can be ad-
justed. Letting P stand for the expected profit
function, the constrained maximum problem
is:
The parameters of the expected profit func-
tion, P, include, among other things, the ex-
plicit interest costs ofeach ofthe three liability
items- the rate on managed liabilities (CDs,
for example) denoted by io, the discount rate,
iB, and the Fed-funds rate, iF' The profit func-
tion also depends on the risk and liquidity
characteristics of assets and liabilities, so that
the marginal returns or costs of each portfolio
item include a marginal non-interest element
in addition to the explicit interest cost.*
The first-order conditions for a maximum
are:
aPlalMB +l = 0
aPlaBR+l=o
aPlaFF+l=o
aPlalMB = - in - rol
- P1MB(IMB, BR, FF)
aPlaBR= iB-PB(IMB, BR, FF) (A2.b')
aPlaFF= iF (A2.c')
Equations (A2.a)-(A2.c) express the equi-
librium condition that marginal costs should
be equalized across liabilities, with l the com-
mon marginal cost. The companion equations
(A2.a')-(A2.c') break down the marginal
costs into their explicit interest component,















On a monthly basis, bank loans are exoge-
nous to the individual bank. They can be
viewed as determined by the public's demand,
given the bank loan rate. The latter, while
ultimately determined by the banks, moves
sluggishly or sporadically, so that for short pe-
riods of time it can be taken as given.
Deposits similarly are assumed to be exog-
enous, reflecting the fact that banks do not ac-
tively alter in the short rUn the terms on which
they are willing to accept deposits. A bank's
short-run portfolio choice therefore reduces to
choosing the structure of non-deposit liabili-
ties- among Fed funds, member-bank bor-














The supply-model specification is completed
by adding the banking industry's balance-sheet
identity, equation (A3.d), and the required-
reserves identity, equation (A3.e). (Here, for
simplicity, we ignore required reserves on
managed liabilities.) Equation (A3.d) implic-
itly yields the stock of deposits created by the
banking system. Deposits for the system as a
whole must be whatever is necessary to fund
the excess of the system's asset holdings
(L+R) over what is financed from non-deposit
sources (1MB +BR+FF).
amount of member-bank borrowing in effect
supplied by the Federal Reserve through the
Discount Window.
IMB* = IMB* (io, iF, iB, ro, L+R - D)
= IMBd(io,Z)
BR*=BR* (io, iF, iB, ro, L+R D)
=R-RU
FF* = FF* (io, iF, iB, ro, L+R - D)
= FP(iF,Z)
1MB + BR+FF= L+R - D
R=rDD
Since only two of the equations are indepen-
dent by virtue of the budget constraint, we can
normalize on one of the marginal non-interest
costs, which we take to be the non-interest
cost of Fed funds. Thus PBrepresents the mar-
ginal non-interest cost of member-bank bor-
rowing relative to the non-interest cost of bor-
rowing in the funds market, and therefore
naturally can be interpreted as the traditional
"reluctance to borrow." In an analogous fash-
ion, P 1MB can be taken as a liquidity premium
reflecting the fact that some managed liabilities
(such as CDs, for example), typically have a
longer maturity than Fed funds. Note that the
interest cost for managed liabilities includes a
term to cover the cost of additional reserves,
where ro is the required-reserve ratio against
managed liabilities and I the marginal cost of
funds. Under lagged reserve accounting, of
course, I should refer to the expected future
cost of funds. Here, for simplicity, we assume
that the expected cost offunds two weeks from
now is today's rate.
Markets for Non-deposit Funds
Solving equations (A2) for 1MB, BR and FF
yields desired stocks for each as functions of
interest rates, the required-reserve ratio
against managed liabilities, and the "wealth"
variable, L + R D. These are listed on the
left-hand side of equations (A3.a)-(A3.c).
If we interpret these bank demands as ag-
gregate demands for the banking system as a
whole, we can solve for market equilibrium by
equating these demands to the corresponding
market supplies provided by either the public
(in the case of managed liabilities and Fed
funds) or by the Federal Reserve (in the case
of reserves). These supplies are shown on the
right-hand side of equations (A3.a)-(A3.c).
Thus IMBd is the public's supply of managed-
liability funds expressed as a function of the
own rate, io, and a vector, Z, of exogenous
determinants (other market rates not appear-
ing in banks' portfolio decisions, and income).
Similarly, FP is the supply of Fed funds by the
nonbank public. In the reserves-market equi-
librium equation (A3.b), R RU is the









Effect of fall in deposits
hand side and subtracting it from total re-
serves, R, to obtain unborrowed reserves, RU.
The curve OF in the northwest quadrant of
Figure Al is obtained by using the equilibrium
conditions in the managed-liabilities and Fed-
funds markets- equations (A3.a) and (A3.c)
respectively- to solve for 1MB, FF, iF, and in
as functions of D. The sum of the solutions for
1MB and FF is then graphed against the solu-
tion for iF to yield OF. Thus OF depicts all
combinations of iF and (1MB +FF) which are
consistent with equilibrium in the markets for
1MB and FF.
A heuristic description of how this process
works is shown in Figures A2 and A3 below,
which show respectively the markets for man-
aged liabilities and Fed funds; in both cases
the demand and supply curves are drawn with
respect to their own rate- in for managed li-
abilities, iF for Fed funds.
Recall that the banks' demands for man-
aged-liabilities funds and Fed funds, 1MB*and
FF*, are also functions of the "wealth" con-
straint R +L D, which measures the fraction
of banks' portfolios which must be supported
by non-deposit sources offunds. An outflow of 1MB
1MB'
1MB' 1MB'
The system has three bank-demand func-
tions, three supply functions of the public or
Federal Reserve, one balance-sheet identity
and one required-reserves identity. Because of
the balance-sheet identity, however, one of the
bank-demand functions is redundant. Hence
there are seven independent equations to de-
termine seven variables- Fed funds (FF),
managed liabilities (1MB), member-bank bor-
rowing (BR), deposits (D), reserves (R) and
the interest rates on Fed funds (iF) and man-
aged liabilities (in). The solutions for these
variables are functions of the exogenous vari-
ables- loans (L), the discount rate (iB), non-
borrowed reserves (RU), the required-reserve
ratios on deposits (rD ) and the other determi-
nants of the public's supply of nondeposit
funds (Z).
To go from equations (A.3) to the curves in
Figure 1, reproduced as Figure A.l below, we
proceed as follows. Two of the associations are
trivial. The required-reserves ray in the south-
east quadrant is obviously equation (A3.c).
The balance-sheet identity in the southwest
quadrant is obtained from (A3.d) by moving
member-bank borrowing, BR*, to the right-
19deposits forces a bank to make up the loss by
finding additional non-deposit funding. For un-
changed rates of interest, banks will make up
the deficit by increasing both the amount of
managed liabilities they offer and the amount
of Fed funds they demand. This is shown in
Figures A2 and A3 by rightward shifts in the
demand curves, IMB* and FF*. The net result
is an increase in both managed liabilities and
Fed funds, and an increase in the funds rate.
Hence a rise in total non-deposit sources of
funds is associated with a rise in the funds rate,
as depicted by the curve OF.
Supply of Deposits
Following conventional practice, we assume
that deposits are a function, among other
things, of the commercial paper rate, icp• The
supply curve of deposits, Os, has a positive
slope with respect to icp; this can be justified
as follows. Presumably commercial paper is a
substitute for banks' managed liabilities and
Fed funds in the public's portfolios. Thus a rise
in the commercial-paper rate can be expected
to reduce the amount of managed liabilities
the public wants to hold and the amount of
Fed funds they are willing to supply. In Figure
Al this would be shown by a rightward shift
in the OF curve, indicating, for an unchanged
funds rate, a reduction in the amount of non-
deposit sources offunds the public is willing to
supply to the banking system. The banking
system, in effect, must replace these funds with
deposits. As a consequence, the banking sys-
tem's demand for reserves would ultimately
rise, showing as a rightward shift in the R d
function. The net result of a rise in the com-
mercial-paper rate therefore would be an in-
crease in the stock of deposits (and an increase
in the funds rate, if not pegged). It is important
to note that the avenue by which commercial
paper rate changes affect the stock of deposits
is the public's portfolio preferences for non-
deposit funds. Thus disturbances to the de-
mand for deposits, to the extent they affect the
commercial paper rate, can affect the supply
of deposits. But clearly such disturbances are
not necessary for the stock of deposits to
change: any disturbance that impinges on the
public's supply of non-deposit funds to the
banks will potentially influence the banks' sup-
ply of deposits to the public.
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